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Consistency of international 
sentencing: ICTY and ICTR 
case study
Barbora Holá and Catrien Bijleveld
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Abstract
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda are the first, post Cold War international criminal tribunals convicting 
perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Their sentencing practice 
has been largely criticized as inconsistent. This quantitative study addresses the criticism and 
empirically investigates the consistency of international sentencing. The extent to which the 
selected factors predict sentence length is tested in a multiple regression analysis. The analysis 
suggests that similar, legally relevant patterns have emerged in the sentencing practice of both 
tribunals. Sentencing in international criminal practice does not appear to be less consistent than 
sentencing under domestic jurisdictions.
Keywords
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Introduction
For more than 15 years now the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the first (post Cold 
War) international criminal ad hoc tribunals, have been sentencing perpetrators of inter-
national crimes. Together they have convicted more than 100 individuals for involve-
ment in genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
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The ICTY and ICTR judges have been vested with almost unfettered discretionary 
powers in sentence determination (UN, 1993; UN, 1994; ICTY Rules, 1994; ICTR 
Rules, 1995), rendering sentencing decisions vulnerable to local or individual particu-
larities and differential weighting of legally relevant (or even irrelevant) factors. Indeed, 
the sentencing practice of the tribunals has been heavily criticized and labelled as confus-
ing, disparate and inconsistent (De Roca, 2008; Drumbl, 2007; Olusanya, 2005). 
Conversely, the scarce empirical evaluative studies (D’Ascoli, 2011; Doherty and 
Steinberg, 2009; Hola et al., 2009; Meernik, 2003; Meernik and King, 2003; Meernik 
et al., 2005) have concluded that there appears to be a fair degree of consistency in inter-
national sentencing, although differences in sentencing mechanisms between the tribu-
nals have never been analysed.
This research adds to previous literature by examining consistency of international sen-
tencing across the two international tribunals (ICTY and ICTR), investigating whether the 
sentencing determinants play a similar or a different role at each of the tribunals, and thus 
whether international sentencing has evolved into a consistent, homogeneous system.1
A central concept is consistency of ‘international punishment’. It is a widely accepted 
principle of human rights that consistency of punishment is necessary for the fair opera-
tion of any criminal justice system (De Roca, 2008; Prosecutor v. Mucic et al., 2001: 
§756). Several dimensions of this concept can be distinguished. First, all sentences 
should follow the same underlying principles: ‘consistency in approach’. Second, similar 
offenders (with similar case attributes) should receive similar sentences: ‘consistency in 
outcome (predictability)’. And finally, for international sentencing to be considered con-
sistent there should be no differences between the tribunals: ‘systemic consistency’. For 
more, see Hola (2012: 10–13).
To empirically explore whether the ICTY and ICTR sentencing practice could be 
labelled as consistent, this article examines all defendants sentenced by the tribunals 
until 1 June 2010. It should be kept in mind that international sentencing is ‘young’, and 
therefore only limited stability in sentencing practice can be expected (Ewald, 2010). 
This study is therefore exploratory in its attempt to detect and describe these emerging 
patterns without any pre-set hypotheses. In the following section, we describe the sen-
tencing law and principles that emerged in the case law of the tribunals. We then present 
the methodology and report our findings. In the conclusion, we situate the results within 
a broader discussion on international sentencing and sentencing consistency.
ICTY and ICTR sentencing law
As noted by Mettraux (2005: 343), it is hard to identify crimes that are more difficult to 
sentence than international crimes. This is owing not merely to the atrocity of interna-
tional crimes but also to their collective, systematic nature, often implicating many indi-
viduals. As a direct result, assigning and, for the purposes of sentencing, ‘measuring’ the 
culpability of individual perpetrators are extremely complex.
The Statutes of the tribunals (UN, 1993, 1994) provide only very general instructions 
regarding sentencing. The regulatory framework for sentencing is almost identical for 
both tribunals. Applicable penalties are limited to imprisonment and, when determining 
the terms of imprisonment, judges have recourse to the local courts’ practices regarding 
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prison sentences (Yugoslavian or Rwandese) (UN, 1993: Article 24; UN, 1994: Article 
23). Reference to local practice has been construed restrictively by the tribunals 
(Prosecutor v. Delic, 2008: §592; Prosecutor v. Semanza, 2005: §377), and judges cite 
applicable domestic provisions mostly as a formality.
Articles 24/23 of the ICTY/ICTR Statute list two general sentencing factors: the grav-
ity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person. However, it 
is unclear what is actually meant by the gravity of a crime or individual circumstances. 
The Statutes do not contain any sentencing tariff or list of factors relevant to sentencing. 
Judges often stress that the gravity of the offence is the primary consideration in sentenc-
ing (Prosecutor v. Mucic, 1998: §1225), which has been interpreted as encompassing 
two aspects: (i) the magnitude of harm caused by the offender, and (ii) the form and 
degree of participation of the accused in the crime, that is, the offender’s culpability 
(Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, 2009: §1147; D’Ascoli, 2011: 145–55; Hola, 2012: 51–4).
The provisions of the Statutes are supplemented by the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. Only Rule 101 is dedicated to factors relevant to sentencing, limiting the range 
of applicable sentences – the maximum being life imprisonment. It also instructs judges 
to take into account any aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances when determining 
the sentence, although only two potential mitigating factors are explicitly mentioned in 
law: ‘superior orders’ and ‘substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor’ (UN, 1993: 
Article 7(2); UN, 1994: Article 6(2); Rules, 1994: Rule 101; Rules, 1995: Rule 101). In 
effect, judges are left to determine what factors justify an increase or reduction in sen-
tence length on a case-by-case basis. Mitigating factors need to be proven ‘upon the 
balance of probabilities’ (the burden of proof is placed on a defence to establish a miti-
gating circumstance) and need not directly relate to the charged offences (Prosecutor v. 
Ndindabahizi, 2004: §502). Aggravating factors must, however, be proven ‘beyond any 
reasonable doubt’ (the burden of proof is placed on a prosecution to establish an aggra-
vating factor) and only those circumstances directly related to the commission of the 
offence charged and to the offender him/herself when he/she committed the offence may 
be considered in aggravation (Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, 2008: §489).
The general principles of sentence determination that evolved in the case law outlined 
above, and further below (see the description of individual independent variables), seem 
to be mutually influential at the ICTY and the ICTR. Judges from one tribunal often refer 
to the case law of the other in their general sentencing considerations, thus developing a 
common ICTY/ICTR narrative (Hola, 2012: 72). The tribunals share a joint Appeals 
Chamber, which also contributes to the development of a consistent jurisprudence (Van 
der Wilt, 2008: 270).
Methodology
Our data comprise all defendants convicted by the ICTY and the ICTR up until 1 June 
2010 (N = 111). All finalized sentences pronounced in individual cases (N = 94) and all 
sentences handed down by trial chambers but still pending on appeal (N = 17) are 
included. The information was obtained from written versions of the judgments pub-
lished on the ICTY and ICTR web pages.
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Table 1. Measurement strategies and proportions/means of independent variables (N = 111)
Legal factor Variable Measurement Proportion / 
Mean (SD)
Category of crimes (each category 









 War crimes 1 = yes 54%
Number of counts (numerical) Number of counts Actual number (1–31) 4.23 (4.4)
Aggravating factors (AFs) 
(numerical)
Number of AFs Actual number (0–10) 3.17 (2.1)
Mitigating factors (MFs) 
(numerical)
Number of MFs Actual number (0–12) 4.42 (3.2)
Mode of liability (each category 
coded as a distinct variable)
Superior 
responsibility
1 = yes 23%
 Hands-on 
perpetration
1 = yes 42%
 Joint criminal 
enterprise
1 = yes 22%
 Planning, instigating, 
ordering
1 = yes 33%
 Aiding and abetting 1 = yes 44%
Actual rank (dummy coded with 








Sentences were analysed at the level of a defendant, measured in years. Nineteen defend-
ants have been convicted to life imprisonment. Because life sentences are indeterminate, 
we have to assign them a numerical value to be able to include them in our quantitative 
analysis. Given that the maximum determinate sentence ever handed down has been 45 
years (Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, 2005) and that the majority of defendants were in their 
mid-40s (or older) at the time of conviction, we recoded ‘life’ to 55 years – a number 
reflecting both the time that an average ICTY/ICTR defendant convicted to life impris-
onment would spend in prison as well as the severity of the sentence.
Independent variables
The following data were collected for each defendant: (a) category of convicted crime, 
(b) number of guilty counts, (c) mode(s) of responsibility, (d) number of mitigating fac-
tors, (e) number of aggravating factors, and (f) rank in the military or political hierarchy. 
The independent variables comprise the two main relevant sentencing considerations 
according to law: the gravity of the crime (category of crime, number of counts, 
aggravating factors, mode of liability and rank) and the individual circumstances of the 
offender (mitigating factors). An overview of the variables is presented in Table 1.
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Category of crime. The tribunals have jurisdiction over three categories of international 
crime: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The Statutes do not distin-
guish between the categories in terms of their objective gravity and related sentence 
length. It is left to the judges’ discretion to determine the gravity of a crime on a case-by-
case basis. Theoretically, the gravity of a crime can be determined in abstracto and in 
concreto.
Gravity in abstracto is based on an analysis, in terms of criminal law, of the subjective 
and objective elements of the crime. The subjective element refers to a guilty mind (mens 
rea) whereas the objective element refers to a criminal act (actus reus). Because the actus 
reus and mens rea may differ per offence (for example, murder compared with plunder), 
the objective gravity of individual offences also varies. Similar arguments could be pre-
sented with respect to individual categories of international crime: that is, genocide 
requires special intent to destroy in whole or in part a specific group of people; crimes 
against humanity must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against 
a civilian population with knowledge of such an attack; war crimes could be isolated 
incidents committed within an armed conflict. Owing to these inherent differences, 
scholars have advocated a hierarchy of individual categories of international crime for 
the purposes of sentencing (Carcano, 2002; Danner, 2001; Olusanya, 2004).
On the other hand, gravity in concreto depends on the actual harm done and the degree 
of culpability of the offender. The ICTY and ICTR judges have consistently emphasized 
the necessity to evaluate gravity in light of the particular circumstances of each case 
(Prosecutor v. Cesic, 2004: §32). However, the question of whether a hierarchy exists 
among the individual categories of crime based on the comparative analysis of their 
gravity in abstracto has also been discussed many times in case law. In the early cases, 
judges accepted the idea of a hierarchy among genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes (Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1997: §73; Prosecutor v. Serushago, 1999: §15). Later, 
however, both tribunals adopted the stance that there is no pre-established hierarchy, 
emphasizing that all crimes under their jurisdiction are very serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law (Prosecutor v. Milosevic, 2007: §989). In order to determine 
whether sentence severity differs for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
we include three separate dichotomous variables reflecting these crimes.
Number of counts. With most accused found guilty of multiple counts, the so-called prin-
ciple of totality implies that the sentence reflects the totality of criminal conduct of a 
defendant (Prosecutor v. Mucic et al., 2003: §46). Arguably, more incidents or the viola-
tion of multiple legal prohibitions should result in a more severe sentence. To test this, 
we recorded the number of counts a defendant was convicted of.
Aggravating factors. Aggravating factors are those circumstances related to the commis-
sion of the offence that increase its criminal severity. Factors taken into account in evalu-
ating the gravity of a particular crime may not be reconsidered as aggravating factors 
(Prosecutor v. Lukic & Lukic, 2009: §1050). Clear guidelines as to what factors are rel-
evant for assessing the gravity of the offence and what circumstances constitute aggra-
vating factors have not yet been developed by the tribunals. The tribunals’ judges have 
accepted a large variety of aggravating factors in the case law. ‘Abuse of superior posi-
tion/authority/influence’ are the most frequent aggravating factors cited by the judges. 
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on July 12, 2013euc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
544 European Journal of Criminology 9(5)
For a list of all the factors that were coded as aggravating when cited by the judges, see 
Hola (2012: 77). Given our sample size, we will investigate not the impact of each sepa-
rate factor but instead their total number.
Mode of liability. The modes of individual liability of which a defendant is convicted are 
indicative of the manner in which he/she participated in crimes. The form and degree of 
participation of an accused in a crime is one of the elements constituting the gravity of 
the crime (Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, 2009: §1147). Article 7(6) of the ICTY/ICTR Stat-
ute differentiates between superior responsibility and planning, instigating, ordering, 
committing or otherwise aiding and abetting in crime (Article 7(3)(1) / 6(3)(1) ICTY/
ICTR Statute). Participation in a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a specific liability 
mode falling under the category of ‘committing’ was developed at the ICTY (Ohlin, 
2007; Van Sliedregt, 2003). Each liability mode entails the proof of specific actus reus 
and mens rea. Consequently, sentence severity should differ depending on whether a 
defendant is convicted as a hands-on perpetrator, as an order-giver, or as ‘an aider’. The 
law, however, contains no guidance for sentence determination in relation to individual 
modes of liability. Some fragmentary principles have evolved in case law.
Liability modes can either ‘augment’ or ‘lessen’ the gravity of a crime (Prosecutor v. 
Ndindabahizi, 2007: §122). It seems to be currently accepted that sentences of those 
convicted on the basis of superior responsibility should be generally lower (Prosecutor 
v. Hadzihasanovic & Kubura, 2006: §2076). Superior responsibility entails liability for 
omission – the failure to prevent or punish subordinates’ crimes. Otherwise, judges dis-
tinguish between direct participation (that is, commission proper, participation in JCE, 
instigating, ordering, planning) and indirect participation (that is, aiding and abetting) 
(Prosecutor v. Semanza, 2005: §388). Direct participation should generally incur a 
higher sentence than criminal participation by way of facilitating and permitting the 
commission of the crimes (Prosecutor v. Mrksic & Sljivancanin, 2009: §407). We 
recorded the mode(s) of liability a defendant was convicted of, that is, committing, par-
ticipating in JCE, ordering/planning/instigating, aiding and abetting, and superior 
responsibility, with liability modes coded as separate dichotomous variables.
Actual rank. Another important factor in the assessment of the gravity of the crime is the 
actual position of a defendant within a state structure. Perpetrators of mass atrocities can 
be divided into three broad categories: leaders (top hierarchical levels), bureaucrats 
(occupying middle-ranking positions and implementing orders stemming from the top 
leadership) and field executors (low-ranking individuals actually committing atrocities). 
These groups represent an ordinal ranking of moral blameworthiness (Smeulers and 
Hola, 2010). It is generally accepted in legal as well as criminological discourse that 
those orchestrating crime at the top leadership levels are the most culpable (Del Ponte, 
2004). Judges seem to endorse this approach, emphasizing that ‘the most senior mem-
bers of a command structure, . . . the leaders and planners of a particular conflict, should 
bear heavier criminal responsibility than those lower down the scale’ (Prosecutor v. 
Musema, 2001: §383). The sentences should thus be graded along these lines, although 
there is one caveat to this principle of gradation: the position of the offender is just one 
and not necessarily the most important consideration in sentencing. In exceptional cases 
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when crimes are extremely grave, even low-ranking defendants could be subjected to 
severe sentences (Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, 2003: §744).
We coded the rank of the offender within the overall state hierarchy as a variable with 
three categories: high, middle and low. The low-ranking category comprises offenders 
who held little or no power/influence in the overall circumstances of each conflict, such 
as camp guards, shift leaders in detention camps, rank and file soldiers, local politicians 
or others with no extensive powers (25 individuals). The middle-ranking category 
encompasses defendants who had more extensive de jure or de facto authority to com-
mand and/or influence the conduct of others, such as camp commanders, local or more 
senior army commanders and conseilleurs, bourgemesters in Rwanda or leaders of the 
Interahamwe (54 individuals). Finally, the group of high-ranking offenders consists of 
regional or national military and political leaders, such as members of regional or national 
governments, regional political leaders, prefects in Rwanda, members of national gov-
ernment, and military officers above the rank of colonel or military commanders of oper-
ational sectors in Rwanda (32 individuals). Rank was coded as a dummy variable, with 
low rank as the reference category.
Mitigating factors. A wide range of factors, generally a defendant’s individual circum-
stances, have been accepted by the ICTY and ICTR judges in mitigation of a sentence. 
‘Family circumstances of a defendant’ or ‘his/her assistance of victims’ are among the 
mitigating factors cited the most at the tribunals. For a list of all factors, see Hola (2012: 
79). Owing to the limited number of cases in our dataset, we are not able to test for differ-
ences between individual mitigating factors and instead focused on the number of 
factors.
Multiple regression was used to analyse the data. Given the sample size for the ICTR, it 
is not feasible to run separate models for the two tribunals. By analysing the data from 
the ICTY and the ICTR in one model, it is assumed that the manner in which the inde-
pendent variables predict sentence length is the same for both tribunals. We examined 
bivariate correlations between sentence length and the predictors separately for each 
tribunal, in order to assess whether correlations are indeed comparable across tribunals, 
using Spearman correlation coefficients because the distribution of sentence length is 
skewed.2 However, because this method investigates only similarity in bivariate associa-
tions across the tribunals, we also included in our regression models a number of interac-
tion terms of type of tribunal with specific independent variables to investigate whether 
this conclusion also holds multivariately.3
Results
All 111 cases of individuals sentenced by the ICTY and the ICTR were included in a 
multiple regression analysis investigating the impact of 12 independent variables on sen-
tence length.4 The results of the analysis are given in Table 2.
Six of the tested legal factors contribute significantly to the prediction of sentence 
length, that is, conviction for genocide, rank of the offender, number of guilty counts, 
conviction for crimes against humanity, and number of aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors. The final model predicts 72 percent of the variability in sentence length.
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The strongest predictor, based on the standardized coefficients, is a conviction for 
genocide. When a defendant is convicted of genocide, his/her sentence is increased by 16 
years and 1 month compared with those not convicted of genocide, all other things being 
equal. In contrast, a conviction for crimes against humanity results, ceteris paribus, in an 
increase of 8 years and 1 month in imprisonment. We cannot interpret the relative addi-
tion of each category of crimes to sentence length because the categories were entered as 
separate variables.5 However, additional analyses indicate that, compared with individu-
als convicted solely of war crimes, those convicted of crimes against humanity receive 
5.3 years extra and those convicted of genocide are sentenced to an extra 20.1 years, 
controlling for all the other variables. On the basis of our analyses, it can be argued that, 
in the tribunals’ sentencing practice, genocide is actually treated as ‘the crime of crimes’ 
and the most serious international crime if other legally relevant factors are taken into 
account.6 In practice, the sentences handed down by the ICTY and the ICTR are ordered 
hierarchically – with genocide at the top of the seriousness scale followed by crimes 
against humanity. A conviction for war crimes did not add significantly to the prediction 
of sentence length.
The second-strongest predictor of sentence length is the rank of the offender. When a 
defendant occupies a position at the top level of a state political or military hierarchy, his/
her sentence is 14 years and 6 months longer, given all other factors, than that for a low-
ranking offender. Consequently, the highest authority figures receive more severe pun-
ishment than their followers – those without any influence in the overall conflict. Since 
the coefficient of middle rank just misses statistical significance, it seems that there is no 
statistically significant decrease in sentence severity between middle- and low-ranking 
offenders. It might be that, in case of low-ranking defendants, considerations of the role 
Table 2. Multiple regression predicting sentence length at the ICTY and ICTR (N = 111)
B b Significance
Conviction for genocide 16.1 .45 .000
Rank (dummy coded – low rank as reference)
High rank 14.5 .39 .000
Middle rank 4.4 .13 .069
Conviction for crimes against humanity 8.1 .20 .001
Number of counts 0.8 .20 .002
Number of aggravating factors 1.5 .19 .001
Number of mitigating factors −0.9 −.18 .005
Conviction as hands-on perpetrator 4.2 .13 .077
Conviction as planner, instigator, order-giver 3.6 .10 .122
Conviction as aider and abettor 2.3 .07 .239
Conviction for war crimes 2.3 .07 .344
Conviction as superior 2.3 .06 .308
Conviction as participant in JCE −0.4 −.01 .882
Intercept −4.5 .503
Notes: Adj R2 = .723; SE = 8.8168; F test (13, 97) = 23.098, p < .0001.
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of the offender in the overall conflict are overshadowed by considerations of the cruelty 
and depravity of the committed crimes and the zeal of their executioners. In contrast to 
their direct, middle-ranking, superiors, the low-ranking offenders are in the majority of 
cases the actual perpetrators committing brutal atrocities, and judges apparently assign 
them equal or even more blame than their direct superiors (Ewald, 2010: 398; Hola et al., 
2009: 90).
The number of guilty counts stands out as the next important predictor of sentence 
length. Each guilty count results in nearly 10 extra months in prison, controlling for the 
other variables. Thus, those involved in more extensive criminal activities are punished 
more severely than those convicted of separate incidents.
The numbers of aggravating and mitigating factors are the final significant predictors 
of sentence length in our model. On average, each factor in mitigation reduces sentence 
length by 11 months and each aggravating factor increases sentence length by an extra 1 
year and 6 months imprisonment, given all the other predictors.7
The regression model described above assumed that the mechanism of sentence deter-
mination was identical at both tribunals. In order to test this assumption we (1) compared 
bivariate correlations across tribunals; and (2) added interaction terms to our regression 
model. No significant differences in bivariate associations of sentence length and tested 
legal factors emerged, except for the association between sentence length and conviction 
under superior responsibility. In this case, the correlation coefficients differ in strength and 
in the direction of association between the tribunals. At the ICTY, sentence length is nega-
tively related to a conviction as a superior and is of medium strength (ρ = −.32); at the 
ICTR, the two are only weakly positively associated (ρ = .24). The negative association 
between sentence length and a conviction as a superior is in accordance with the judges’ 
argumentation discussed above. Superior responsibility is based on a superior’s omitting to 
prevent or punish the crimes of his/her subordinates and, therefore, entails lower sentences 
compared with other modes of liability representing more active participation in crime. The 
difference between the tribunals in correlation coefficients might be influenced by the fact 
that superior responsibility has arguably not played such a prominent role at the ICTR as at 
the ICTY and many defendants were convicted of a combination of superior responsibility 
with other more active modes of liability, such as perpetration.8
Although we established that almost no differences exist in bivariate associations, 
such a difference might still emerge in a multivariate model. In order to test this, we ran 
several multiple regression models with interaction terms added (Cohen et al., 2003). As 
a starting point, we used the model with all significant predictors of sentence length 
resulting from the regression analysis. Then we separately (one by one) added an interac-
tion term between each significant predictor and the type of tribunal. Given the sample 
size, not all interaction terms could be added at the same time. In general, our additional 
analyses indicated that there appear to be no significant differences between the tribunals 
in the impact of each predictor on sentence length. Only for the number of counts does 
the effect on sentence length appear to differ depending on the tribunal.9 It seems that at 
the ICTR each additional count results in a larger sentence increase than at the ICTY. 
This difference is likely related to the fact that ICTR defendants are on average convicted 
of a lower number of counts compared with ICTY defendants, yet are nonetheless sen-
tenced to severe sentences. At the ICTR, the crime base (factual background) of these 
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guilty counts generally covers a much broader array of incidents that are usually the most 
serious violations of international criminal law (such as multiple murders of hundreds of 
victims) and is thus qualitatively different from a guilty count covering only one inci-
dent, often of a less serious nature (such as mistreatment of a victim), as occurs at the 
ICTY. Formulated differently, at the ICTY, sentence length is more often determined by 
the accumulation of more counts of a less serious nature. At the ICTR, a smaller number 
of counts of more serious crimes give rise to lengthier sentences.
Discussion and conclusions
The ICTY and ICTR sentencing practices have been subjected to a lot of criticism. 
Academics have repeatedly denounced the tribunals’ sentencing and labelled it as incon-
sistent and erratic. However, this criticism was not founded on a comprehensive empiri-
cal analysis of the tribunals’ sentencing practice. The current study has tried to address 
this issue by examining the sentences handed down by the ICTY and the ICTR. The 
primary aim of this empirical enquiry was to explain the dynamics of a number of promi-
nent legal factors behind sentence determination and to evaluate the consistency of inter-
national sentencing practice.
The sentencing practice of the ad hoc tribunals emerges as consistent. Regarding con-
sistency in approach, the sentencing jurisprudence appears similar, with judges of both 
tribunals cross-referencing each other’s case law. Consequently, the case law of the 
ICTY and the ICTR has developed fairly similarly and a set of general sentencing prin-
ciples is consistently referred to in the case law, such as the primary importance of the 
gravity of the crime for sentence severity or the principle of gradation of sentence rela-
tive to the seniority of a defendant. For a detailed discussion, see Hola (2012: 26–83).
Regarding consistency in outcome, the regression model accounted for 70 percent of 
the variation in sentence length at the ICTY and the ICTR. It is very difficult to judge the 
adequacy of this figure, both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, sentencing 
should never be 100 percent predictable. In order to be fair, sentences should be not only 
predictable but also individualized, reflecting the particularities of each case. Therefore, 
some variation should always remain unexplained to allow for individualization. The 
explained variation that emerged in our study is comparable to that found in similar 
quantitative research into sentencing consistency at a domestic level (Anderson and 
Spohn, 2010: 389; Engen and Gainey, 2000: 1209). In many countries, concerns over 
unwarranted disparities in sentencing have led to reforms of sentencing law, introducing, 
for example, determinate sentencing law or numerical sentencing guidelines that limit 
the discretionary powers of domestic judges. To assess the success of these reforms, 
studies evaluating sentencing predictability at a domestic level have been conducted, 
showing that legally relevant factors are the most important determinants of sentences, 
explaining as much as 70 percent of the variation in imprisonment length (Hofer et al., 
1999). Consequently, it seems that, at the international level, despite the lack of sentenc-
ing guidelines and the large discretionary powers of judges, the sentences are as statisti-
cally predictable as sentences in domestic legal systems with more detailed legal 
regulation of sentence determination.
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We also analysed the overall consistency of international sentencing practice (‘sys-
temic consistency’), examining possible differences across the two international criminal 
tribunals. It turned out that in this regard too international sentencing emerges as consist-
ent. Looking at the set of empirically most important predictors of sentence length, there 
are no major differences in the mechanisms behind sentence determination at both tribu-
nals. Empirically consistent (and legally relevant) patterns have emerged in the sentenc-
ing practice of both tribunals: those convicted of genocide are subjected to more severe 
sentences than those convicted of crimes against humanity; high-ranking defendants are 
sentenced more harshly than low-ranking individuals; more severe sentences are handed 
out to defendants convicted of multiple crimes; and mitigating and aggravating factors 
account for sentence mitigation/aggravation.
In the end, we have to address the limitations of our study. As already noted, a vast 
array of legally relevant factors are at play and it is in practice impossible to examine 
them all simultaneously in a multivariate analysis with a dataset that is small in a statisti-
cal sense – even though it comprises the entire ‘population’ of decided cases. It would be 
desirable if a more detailed analysis could be performed and differences in sentence 
length between, for example, individual underlying offences (such as a conviction for 
murder compared with a conviction for torture) or individual aggravating and mitigating 
factors examined. Although our study is one of the first to examine jointly the ICTY and 
ICTR sentencing practice, the dataset is by necessity unbalanced. More cases have been 
decided by the ICTY (N = 71) than by the ICTR (N = 40). Thus, ICTY patterns in a sense 
will play a larger role in the regression model. It should also be noted that the character-
istics of defendants included in our sample do not fully represent the whole population 
of individuals to be (potentially) convicted by the ICTY and the ICTR. The cases still 
pending before the tribunals’ Trial Chambers represent more complicated and arguably 
also more serious cases, in the sense of the seniority of the accused and in relation to the 
crime base/crime gravity, compared with the already finished cases.
Furthermore, there are observable differences between the two tribunals in the com-
position of cases and the distribution of sentences. The ICTR sentences tend to be much 
longer than the sentences pronounced by the ICTY. Arguably, the lengthier ICTR sen-
tences are related to the different composition of cases dealt with by the two tribunals. At 
the ICTR, all defendants have been tried on genocide charges, the majority are subse-
quently convicted of genocidal killings, and many of them are sentenced to life imprison-
ment. This is not the case at the ICTY, where charges are more varied, convictions for 
crimes against humanity/war crimes are prevalent, and life imprisonment is an excep-
tional sentence. Consequently, qualitatively different crimes are dealt with and quantita-
tively different sentences are handed down at the two tribunals. These issues – that is, 
different N, qualitatively different crimes, quantitatively different sentences – make a 
quantitative analysis of the tribunals’ sentencing practices and interpretation of the 
results complex. Even so, it does appear that the same legal factors are accorded similar 
importance at both tribunals.
This research constitutes one of the first studies comprehensively testing the interna-
tional sentencing practice represented by the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals – 
the ICTY and the ICTR. Despite inherent limitations, we have shown that legally relevant 
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patterns are evident in international sentencing practice. In short, international sentenc-
ing practice is consistent in approach, in outcome and across tribunals. Since the ICTY 
and the ICTR are still functioning tribunals, pronouncing new verdicts and sentences, it 
will be possible to carry out a more detailed empirical analysis of international sentenc-
ing in the future with more cases. Such research could also include future sentences 
pronounced by other international courts, such as the International Criminal Court, or by 
domestic courts dealing with international crimes, in order to assess whether there has 
indeed emerged one ‘common’ system of international sentencing.
Notes
1. The article excludes other courts with international elements dealing with international crimes 
(internationalized courts), such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone or the Special Panels 
for Serious Crimes in East Timor, for two reasons: (i) theoretically, it is arguable that all the 
internationalized courts have a much stronger ‘national element’ and it is thus difficult to 
make direct comparisons; and (ii) methodologically/pragmatically, it is not possible to make 
any sensible comparisons because either there have not been so many cases completed by 
these courts or the composition of convictions is not as varied as in the ICTY/ICTR. For more 
detailed discussion, see Hola (2012: 8–9).
2. Using Blalock’s formula (Blalock, 1972), we tested for any differences between the tribunals.
3. To make sure that the solution is robust against our choice to code life sentences as ‘55 
years’, the model was tested; (1) with life sentences recoded to 55 years; (2) with life sen-
tences recoded to 45 and 65 years; and finally (3) with no life sentences included. The set 
of statistically significant predictors remained the same and the regression coefficients were 
comparable.
4. The first block included the following 11 variables: genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, number of counts, number of aggravating factors, number of mitigating factors, per-
petration, aiding/abetting, ordering/instigating/planning, superior responsibility, and partici-
pating in JCE. Rank was added to the model in a second block as a dummy coded variable 
(high, middle; low as a reference category). This led to a statistically significant improvement 
in the model (F change (2,97) = 16,246, p < .0001).
5. This modelling strategy had been chosen to assess whether the categories of crimes are hierar-
chically ordered in practice. Given that that turned out to be the case, we are able to construct 
a new categorical variable where each defendant is categorized according to the most serious 
crime he/she was convicted of. Next, we were able to run an additional analysis with category 
of crimes coded as a dummy variable, with the category leading to the shortest sentences 
coded as the reference category.
6. It should also be noted that almost all convictions for genocide have been at the ICTR. At the 
time of writing, only one defendant has been convicted of genocide at the ICTY (Radislav 
Krstic).
7. None of the other factors included in the analysis add significantly to the prediction of sen-
tence length. All the statistical assumptions for multiple regression were met.
8. For a more detailed discussion, see Hola (2012: 190).
9. The analysis of interaction terms was, however, technically complicated by multicollinearity. 
The problem remained even after centring the variables. In order to double-check for possible 
interactions, we ran several different models and the only interaction term that remained sig-
nificant was the interaction of number of counts with tribunal. For a more detailed discussion 
of the methodology, see Hola (2012: 194–6).
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